But according to the District Court, “an individual’s personal computing device is not a ‘facility through which an electronic communications service is provided.’”88 We agree, and we find persuasive the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. City of Laredo, which held that “a home computer of an end user is not protected by the [Act].”89 As noted by the Garcia court, though the Act does not define the term “facility,” the Act does define the term “electronic communication service,” which it defines as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”90 This most naturally describes network service providers, and, indeed, “[c]ourts have interpreted the statute to apply to providers of a communication service such as telephone companies, [i]nternet or e-mail service providers, and bulletin board services.”91 The Act also defines “electronic storage” as “(A) 88 In re: Google, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 89 702 F.3d at 793 (quoting Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1215). 90 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1)); see also Garcia, 702 F.3d at 792. 91 Garcia, 702 F.3d at 792 (citing Councilman, 418 F.3d at 81-82; Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also In re iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1057 (“[T]he computer systems of an email provider, a bulletin board system, or an [internet service provider] are uncontroversial examples of facilities that 43