12 The second strategy was to illustrate the least restrictive scope of the internet shutdown. In Gaurav Sureshbhai Vyas, the State of Gujarat in India argued that only mobile internet was blocked which meant that people could still access the internet through certain wi-fi or broadband services. Finally, several respondents argued that the existing domestic legal framework vested the authority in question with the power to order the shutdown. For example, in Banashree Gogoi, the respondents argued that the notifications issued under section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 are sufficient justification for the suspension of internet services. The state further argued that there was a review meeting conducted by relevant state authorities where inputs from various intelligence agencies were considered, and the decision to continue the internet shutdown and blocking of bulk SMS was taken. Similarly, the respondents in CM Pak argued that the federal government is vested with the jurisdiction to issue policy directives regarding the closure of internet services due to national security concerns as provided under section 8(2)(c) read with section 54 (2) of the Pakistan Telecommunications (Reorganisation) Act of 1996. For example, in Amnesty International Togo, it was held that in order for an application to succeed, status of victim or indirect victim needs to be established.* The court acknowledged that the applicants were non-governmental organisations seeking to protect human rights, and therefore, not being able to use the internet has negative repercussions on their functioning.®? Further, citing authority (Dexter Oil v Republic of Liberia)** the Court clarified that non-natural persons can enjoy freedom of expression and can initiate action. Therefore, it held that human rights organisations can also be victims of state action and as their daily functioning was impaired by the internet shutdown, they had locus standi. In the Cameroon case, where a statutory provision was a bar to admissibility, the court chose to opt for the narrow textual reading.34 The Constitutional Council adopted a textual reading of Article 4.7(2)%5 of the Constitution which circumscribes the right to approach the Constitutional Council to a limited number of political functionaries and therefore the independent lawyers and civil society activists which approached in this case did not have the right to approach this court. Reference to domestic law Judgement Procedural questions Admissibility In many instances of successful internet shutdown litigation, courts have favourably looked at petitioners’ arguments showing irregular procedural norms and improper usage of domestic statutes by authorities in order to enforce internet Often petitions are dismissed by courts due to them being rendered inadmissible. This may be for a variety of reasons including the lack of locus standi on part of the petitioners, improper forum for redress or lack of a judicial remedy available in the said case. In several common law jurisdictions that relax the doctrine of locus standi in public interest including India and Zimbabwe, admissibility was not a challenge. In other jurisdictions, courts did examine the locus standi of the petitioner to determine whether it was admissible. shutdowns. Several cases show that, at times, technical and legal questions have played an equal, if not more, role in informing courts’ decisions in determining the lawfulness of internet shutdowns. In Zimbabwe, in the ZLHR and MISA Zimbabwe case, the High Court of Zimbabwe set aside the directive issued by the authority that had passed the directive ofMinister of State in the President’s Office Responsible for National Security. The High Court took cognizance of the petitioners’ argument 31 Amnesty International Togo & Ors v The Togolese Republic, Paras 26-36 32 Ibid., Para 36 33 Dexter Oil Limited v Republic of Liberia 34 Global Concern Cameroon v Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, Cameroon Telecommunication, and State of Cameroon, Pages 3-5 35 Article 47(2) of the Constitution of Cameroon states that matters may be referred to the Constitutional Council by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, one-third of the members of the National Assembly or one-third of the Senators. 36 Interception of Communications Act. (2007). http: //www.veritaszim.net/node/252 37 ZLHR and MISA Zimbabwe v Minister of State for National Security and Others, Para 47