OOO MEMO v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT (b) Whether the interference pursued a “legitimate aim” 35. The Court observes at the outset that the claimant in the defamation proceedings under consideration is the executive authority of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. 36. In the Government’s submission, the interference complained of had pursued a legitimate aim of “the protection of the reputation and rights of others”. The applicant company objected arguing that the Administration of the Volgograd Region could not claim to hold any “business reputation”. 37. The Court reiterates that the list of legitimate aims provided in paragraph 2 of Article 10 is exhaustive. Strictly construed, this paragraph accords – as a matter of exception, in view of its special role in society – protection to only one branch of public powers, the judiciary (see, for details, Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, §§ 128-30, ECHR 2015). 38. The Court has long held that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life. The concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition, which covers also the physical and psychological integrity of a person. In order for Article 8 to come into play, however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (see, with further references, Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], no. 17224/11, § 76, 27 June 2017). 39. Yet the ambit of the “protection of the reputation ... of others” clause of paragraph 2 of Article 10 is not restricted to natural persons, notwithstanding a difference between the reputational interests of a legal entity and the reputation of an individual as a member of society in so far as the former are devoid of the moral dimension of human dignity (see OOO Regnum v. Russia, no. 22649/08, § 66, 8 September 2020). 40. The Court has recognised that there exists a legitimate “interest in protecting the commercial success and viability of companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, but also for the wider economic good” (see Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 94, ECHR 2005-II, and Uj v. Hungary, no. 23954/10, § 22, 19 July 2011). However, these considerations are inapplicable to a body vested with executive powers and which does not engage as such in direct economic activities. 41. As regards public bodies seeking legal protection of their reputation, in the case of Lombardo and Others v. Malta (no. 7333/06, 24 April 2007) the Court, noting that it was only in exceptional circumstances that a measure proscribing statements criticising the acts or omissions of an elected body could be justified with reference to “the protection of the rights or reputations of others”, was prepared to assume that this aim could be relied on as legitimate in the context of defamation proceedings brought by the local council of a town with a population of under 12,000 persons. When assessing 10