2:18-cv-02573-DCN Date Filed 02/08/19 Entry Number 17 Page 3 of 11 pleading as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. The motion can be granted only if the party opposing the motion has failed to set forth sufficient factual matters to state a plausible claim for relief “on its face”. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); see also Vogt v. Greenmarine Holding, LLC, 318 F.Supp. 2d 136, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [“[O]n a motion to dismiss, the Court does not weigh the strength of the evidence, and simply considers whether the [claim] alleges sufficient facts which, if true, would permit a reasonable fact finder to find [the party seeking dismissal of the claim] liable.”]. Further, Federal Courts are also charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant (such as the Plaintiff here) to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a Federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep’t of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, after careful review and consideration of the allegations of the Complaint in conjunction with the applicable standards and caselaw, the undersigned finds for the reasons set forth hereinbelow that the Defendant is entitled to dismissal of this case. The Defendant is an online news and social networking service on which users post and interact with messages known as “tweets”. The Defendant requires users of its networking service to abide by its “Terms of Service” and “Hate Speech” policy, both of which are contained 3