neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48). ¶ 47 We find City of Renton instructive. That case involved the first amendment validity of a Renton, Washington, zoning regulation of adult movie theaters. The Supreme Court observed that the Renton ordinance “does not appear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’ or the ‘content-neutral’ category. To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.” City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the ordinance was “aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.” (Emphases in original.) Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that “the City Council’s ‘predominate concerns’ were with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult films themselves.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 48 Further, in Turner Broadcasting System, the Court recognized that “[r]egulations that discriminate among media, or among different speakers within a single medium, often present serious First Amendment concerns.” Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 659. Nevertheless, the Court further instructed that “[i]t would be error to conclude, however, that the First Amendment mandates strict scrutiny for any speech regulation that applies to one medium (or a subset thereof) but not others.” Id. at 660. These cases instruct that the proper focus is on whether the government has addressed a category of speech to suppress discussion of that topic. ¶ 49 In the case at bar, section 11-23.5(b) is justified on the grounds of protecting privacy. Section 11-23.5(b) distinguishes the dissemination of a sexual image not based on the content of the image itself but, rather, based on whether the disseminator obtained the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know that the image was to remain private and knows or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination. 720 ILCS 5/1123.5(b)(2), (b)(3) (West 2016). There is no criminal liability for the dissemination of the very same image obtained and distributed with consent. The manner of the image’s acquisition and publication, and not its content, is thus crucial to the illegality of its dissemination. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at - 14 -