Rodriguez v. Google LLC 20-cv-04688-RS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2024) expert. See id. at 595. Ultimately, the purpose of the assessment is to exclude speculative or unreliable testimony to ensure accurate, unbiased decision-making by the trier of fact. Next, Plaintiffs proposed classes satisfy the commonality requirement because their claims pose common “questions of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2). Plaintiffs suggest that common questions include whether Google has “permission” to collect third party app data based on the “objective meaning” of Google's sWAA disclosures. Id. Plaintiffs' claims raise a “common contention” as to Google's conduct, and the “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Therefore, Plaintiffs meet the commonality requirement. IV. DISCUSSION A. Class Certification 6 Plaintiffs contend their claims warrant class-wide treatment because they satisfy the four 23(a) requirements, common questions predominate over individual ones pursuant to 23(b)(3), and they seek uniform equitable relief from Google's conduct per 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs seek application of California law to all claims. Defendants do not raise any choice-of-law related objections and *6 focus on California law in opposing Plaintiff's motion for class certification. c. Typicality I. 23(a) requirements Plaintiffs meet the four 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Class 1 proposes Android users, while Class 2 proposes non-Android users, who during the class period had their WAA/sWAA settings turned off and had their data transmitted to Google while using non-Google branded apps. a. Numerosity First, each of the proposed classes contain members so numerous that class-wide treatment is appropriate. The numerosity prong of Rule 23(a) requires joinder to be “impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). There is no numerical cutoff to determine whether this requirement has been met. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Instead, a fact-specific inquiry may be used to determine whether joinder would be impracticable. Id. Here, each of Plaintiffs' proposed classes constitute millions of users, so this condition is satisfied. b. Commonality 7 Named plaintiffs' individual claims are also typical of those of the proposed class members. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). “The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). All named plaintiffs are Google users who used thirdparty apps with the Firebase and/or Google Mobile Ads SDKs. Named Plaintiffs *7 Rodriguez, Cataldo, and Harvey are Android users and aver claims typical of Class 1, while named Plaintiff Santiago uses an Apple device and avers claims typical of Class 2. d. Adequacy Finally, Plaintiffs and their counsel “fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class[es].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). Two questions determine adequacy: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs and their counsel have shown no conflicts of interest, and Google has not asserted any. Further, Plaintiffs and their counsel state in their declaration that they are committed to the 4