the ordinary court proceedings and the law that is currently applicable. aa) At the time the Higher Regional Court rendered its decision, the legal dispute was governed by German legislation implementing the comprehensive and binding standards set by Directive 95/46/EC. 35 (1) At that time, what personal data a search engine was allowed to reference by displaying links following a search request fell within the scope of application of Directive 95/46/EC and was set out in detail in that directive (cf. Arts. 2, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 14 Directive 95/46/EC; cf. CJEU, Judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain, C-131/ 12, EU:C:2014:317, paras. 28, 41, 73 et seq.). This question did not fall under the so-called media privilege in respect of which the Member States are afforded legislative latitude pursuant to Art. 9 of Directive 95/46/EC, and thus benefit from derogations from the requirements laid down by the directive (this differs from the constellation discussed in the Order of the First Senate also issued today - 1 BvR 16/13 -). Data processing by the search engine operator cannot be considered data processing for journalistic purposes within the meaning of that provision (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain, C-131/12, EU:C:2014:317, para. 85). 36 (2) Therefore, the directive’s substantive requirements in respect of the protection against the processing of personal data apply. In light of the subsequent development of the law, these requirements must in any case be considered fully harmonised under EU law at the time the Higher Regional Court rendered its decision. 37 Of course, the fact that these requirements are only set out in a directive appears, initially, contrary to full harmonisation. Typically, it must be assumed that the EU, when choosing a directive to regulate a matter, does not seek full harmonisation of the matter, but intends to leave the Member States legislative latitude. This assumption is supported by Art. 288(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), according to which a directive leaves the Member States the choice of form and method to achieve binding aims, and by Art. 288(2) TFEU, which distinguishes regulations from directives. It is also supported by the principle of subsidiarity under Art. 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Nevertheless, the extent to which a directive is binding ultimately depends on its specific contents. This means that a directive may even fully harmonise certain matters (cf. CJEU, Judgment of 25 April 2002, Commission v France, C-52/00, EU:C:2002:252, para. 16 et seq.; Judgment of 24 January 2012, Dominguez, C-282/10, EU:C:2012:33, para. 33 et seq.; Judgment of 21 November 2018, Ayubi, C-713/17, EU:C:2018:929, para. 37 et seq.; Judgment of 29 July 2019, Funke Medien NRW, C-469/17, EU:C:2019:623, para. 35 et seq.; Judgment of 29 July 2019, Pelham and Others, C-476/17, EU:C:2019:624, para. 58 et seq.; cf. also Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE 118, 79 <95 and 96>). 38 In its established case-law, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) assumes that Directive 95/46/EC fully harmonises the substantive requirements for da- 39 6/36