- 36 A B A 86. Mr Pun relies on the observation of Cromwell J in R v Vu B [2013] RCS 657 at paragraph 51 to support his argument that the C D information accessed through a mobile phone should be treated as a separate place. Cromwell J said this at paragraph 51: “[51] As I explained above, if computers give rise to particular privacy interests that distinguish them from other receptacles typically found in a place, then s. 8 requires those interests to be taken into account before the search takes place, not just after-the-fact, in order to ensure that the state’s interest in conducting the search justifies the intrusion into individual privacy. In effect, the privacy interests at stake when computers are searched require that those devices be treated, to a certain extent, as a separate place.” (emphasis added) E F G H I 87. With respect, this does not assist Mr Pun. J L N E F G H I In Vu, the court was concerned with the issue of whether a search warrant, without specifying the search of computer found at the place identified in the warrant, could be impliedly inferred to include the searching of the computer found there. M D J 88. K C K L It was in this particular context where search warrant had been issued that Cromwell J made the observation that, for privacy concern and interests, the computer as a M N device containing massive personal data and information could “to a O P certain extent” be treated as a separate place and thus not covered by the specific search warrant. The court concluded that no such necessary O P inference could be drawn. Q R Q 89. The issue therefore concerns with the construction of the R scope of the specific warrant in question, and it is in that context that S Cromwell J made the above observation, by emphasizing that “to a S T T U U V V