Regarding the provisions of sections 31(1), (2) & (3) of POTA, Mr Nyakiha submitted that, they are only applicable by the Police with prior written consent of the Attorney General to search for and obtain evidence of commission of an offence under POTA and the Court can only grant the Police ex-parte application for an interception of communication or admissibility of intercepted communications if it is satisfied that the written consent of the Attorney General has been obtained as required by the law and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that material information relating to the commission of an offence under POTA or the whereabouts of the person suspected by the Police Officer to have committed the offence is contained in that communication or communications of that description. In view of the foregoing, he submitted that sections 31(1 )-(4) cannot thus be read in isolation of section 34(4) of POTA on the ground that both the provisions provide statutory procedures to be met by the Police, the Attorney General and the Court before specified offender's communication is intercepted and retained by the Police through the communication service provider and or exclusion of any person other than the parties and their legal representatives from the instituted proceedings under POTA. Through such legal processes, Mr. Nyakiha stressed that section 34(4) of POTA is in conformity with the right to fair trial under article 13(1) and (6) when is read together with article 30(2) (a) of the Constitution quoted above. Regarding sections 35, 42(1) & (2) and 54 of POTA, the respondents' counsel argued that, they do not offend one's Constitutional rights in relation to fair trial, presumption of innocence, property and forming associations or Page 9 of 37