MAJIEDT J [23] The applicants further assert that the respondents’ SLAPP special pleas lack averments necessary to sustain the defence they wish to raise, as the respondents seek to have the merits of a claim excluded from the abuse of process analysis, contrary to that doctrine. Therefore, the applicants submit that their first set of exceptions, otherwise compliant with the exception procedure, accordingly, stand to be upheld. [24] The applicants oppose the development of the common law, for which the respondents contend in the alternative, on the basis that the respondents have failed to satisfy the applicable test, as summarised by this Court in DZ.16 The applicants further submit that the common law principles of abuse of process are not inconsistent with section 16 or section 34 of the Constitution, relied on by the respondents, nor the constitutional value system. Moreover, the applicants submit that the international approach to the regulation of SLAPP suits, invoked by the respondents, is merits-centric and establishes that law reform on the topic is a complicated exercise best left to the Legislature. The respondents’ main submissions [25] The respondents assert that, on the well-established approach to exceptions, it must be accepted as true that— (a) the plaintiffs do not honestly believe that they have any prospect of recovering the amount of damages claimed from the defendants; (b) the plaintiffs’ defamation actions are brought for the purpose of— (i) discouraging, censoring, intimidating, and silencing the defendants in relation to public criticism of them; and (ii) intimidating and silencing members of civil society, the public, and the media in relation to public criticism of them; and 16 MEC for Health and Social Development, Gauteng v DZ obo WZ [2017] ZACC 37; 2018 (1) SA 335 (CC); 2017 12 BCLR 1528 (CC) at para 31. 11