PREZHDAROVI v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT 11 16 December 1997, § 45, Reports 1997-VIII, and Heino, cited above, §§ 40 and 46). 45. As stated above, Article 191 § 1 of the 1974 Code allowed the police to conduct an immediate search-and-seizure operation outside the criminal proceedings if that was the only possibility of collecting and securing evidence. The wording of that provision allowed the police authorities to carry out searches without a prior judicial warrant and essentially gave them the discretion to decide whether the circumstances were pressing. The Court, however, doubts whether the circumstances in the present case were really pressing, given that the prosecutor ordered the said operation three weeks before it was conducted. The authorities received information about the illegal distribution of computer products on 31 January, yet the operation was scheduled for 21 February 2005. Therefore the authorities had enough time to collect more information regarding the alleged criminal conduct, to open criminal proceedings and to submit a prior request to the court. 46. The Court has considered that in such a situation, the absence of a prior judicial warrant may be counterbalanced by the availability of a retrospective judicial review (see Heino, cited above, § 45, and Smirnov v. Russia, no. 71362/01, § 45, 7 June 2007). It reiterates in this respect that notwithstanding the margin of appreciation which the Court recognises the Contracting States have in this sphere, it must be particularly vigilant where, as in the present case, it appears that the authorities are empowered under national law to order and effect searches without a judicial warrant (see Heino, cited above, § 40). 47. The Court thus needs to examine whether the post factum judicial review offered sufficient guarantees that the applicants’ right to respect for their private life was not breached. The Court notes at the outset that the relevant domestic law made no mention of the scope of the judicial examination. Therefore the Court turns to the reasoning offered by the domestic court when approving the operation. It notes in this connection that the court limited its reasoning to describing factually the course of the search-and-seizure operation and briefly citing the text of Article 135 § 2 of the 1974 Code, stressing that there had been pressing circumstances and that an immediate search and seizure had been the only means by which the collection and preservation of the necessary evidence could be undertaken. No additional reasoning as to the lawfulness or justification of the impugned measure was given (see the similar approach in Gutsanovi, cited above, § 223). 48. The Government did not assert that the applicants had any other opportunities to have the lawfulness and the justification of the impugned measure reviewed by a court (see Gutsanovi, cited above, § 223). 49. Furthermore, the Court notes that following the seizure, the applicants complained several times, asserting that the computers contained