7 . . are ethical preparations which can only be dispensed on a doctor’s prescription, but this factor is in no way conclusive. The question is not what the appellant says it intends doing, but what it will be permitted to do if its application is granted in respect of all goods in Class 3. In my opinion it is correct to say, as Romer, J., held in Jellinek’s Application, 63 R.P.C. 59 at p. 78, that “The onus must be discharged by the applicant in respect of all goods coming within the specification applied for, and not only in respect of those goods on which he is proposing to use (the mark) immediately, nor is the onus discharged by proof only that any particular method of user will not give rise to confusion; the test is: What can the applicant do?”’ (My emphasis). The reason for the rule embodied in s 10(14) is, as was stated by Lord Macnaghten in Eno v Dunn,6 the protection of the public: ‘The question is one between Mr Dunn and the public, not between Mr Eno and Mr Dunn. It is immaterial whether the professed registration is or is not likely to injure Mr Eno in his trade.’ [16] The court below was of the view that Adcock had not made out a case for the purposes of s 10(14) calling for a comparison of all the goods in the specification of ZEMAX. I do not agree. It is difficult to understand what else should have been pleaded or what other evidence could have been presented to address this issue. So far as both trade marks are registered in respect of goods that are obtainable without prescription, the market is the ordinary consumer. I have no doubt that there is likely to be confusion when the marks are applied to such goods. This was never seriously challenged by Cipla. Its entire argument was based on a restricted use confined to prescription medication. [17] However, under s 24(1) of the Act the court or the Registrar rectifying entries in the register of trade marks, ‘may make such order for making, removing or varying the entry as it or he may deem fit’. A court or the Registrar exercising a discretion under s 24(1) may, thus, excise some of the goods in respect of which the trade mark under attack was registered.7 Counsel for Cipla submitted that in those circumstances we should expunge the trade mark for all but ‘pharmaceutical 6 Eno v Dunn (1890) 15 App Cas 252 (HL (E)) at 264 and see the discussion in Webster and Page para 6.12. 7 Century City Apartments Property Services CC & another v Century City Property Owners’ Association 2010 (3) SA 1 (SCA) para 50 and cf Arjo Wiggings Ltd v Idem (Pty) Ltd & another 2002 (1) SA 591 (SCA) paras 13 ff.