Scarborough v. Frederick Cnty. Sch. Bd. appropriate where ... there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues." Smith v. Smith , 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, " [p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not ... without limits." Beaudett v. City of Hampton , 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). "A pro se plaintiff still must allege facts that state a cause of action." Bracey v. Buchanan , 55 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citation omitted). ANALYSIS A. Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 —First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause 576 Defendants argue that the first of Scarborough's three § 1983 claims should be dismissed as to all four defendants, but for different reasons. As to the First Amendment claim premised on Edwards's and FCSB's alleged acts of deleting her critical comments and banning her from the FCPS Facebook page, Defendants argue that Scarborough has failed to allege enough facts— including the specifics of the comments at issue— to support this claim. Regarding the First Amendment claim stemming from Sovine's and Angelo's use of Twitter, Defendants argue, among other things, that Scarborough has failed to credibly allege that these school administrators maintained these accounts in their official capacities. Finally, defendants argue that the equal protection aspect of Count I fails because Scarborough's allegations fail to establish the elements of an *576 equal protection claim. The court will address each argument in turn. a. Alleged First Violation: Facebook Amendment Defendants argue that Scarborough's First Amendment claims against FCSB and Edwards are too vague and fail to state a claim. Specifically, Defendants contend that Scarborough's allegations that FCSB and Edwards 517 F. Supp. 3d 569 (W.D. Va. 2021) "censored" her are devoid of sufficient factual detail to identify which act or acts of free speech these two defendants allegedly abridged, including "what comments or statements were made, blocked, or deleted." (ECF No. 38 at 11.) As the argument goes, neither the court nor Defendants can evaluate whether Scarborough engaged in any protected First Amendment activity. Scarborough has adequately pleaded a First Amendment claim against Edwards and FCSB. To determine whether Defendants violated Scarborough's First Amendment rights, the court must engage in a three-step analysis.3 First, the court must determine whether the speech at issue is "protected by the First Amendment." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. , 473 U.S. 788, 797, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). Assuming that it is, the court "must then assess whether the putative forum is susceptible to forum analysis at all." Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump , 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). If forum analysis applies, the court must lastly assess whether "the extent to which the Government [has] control[led] access" is permissible given the type of forum at issue. Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439. 3 Scarborough also brings this claim under Article I, section 12 of the Virginia Constitution, which is Virginia's analogue to the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. Because the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that Article I, section 12 of the "coextensive provisions Virginia with of the the Constitution free federal is speech First Amendment," the court analyzes these claims together. Elliott v. Commonwealth , 267 Va. 464, 593 S.E.2d 263 (2004). Scarborough easily satisfies the first element. As alleged in her Second Amended Complaint, the speech at issue consists of her Facebook comments about FCPS's COVID-19 protocols. This type of public expression—i.e. , "speech on matters of public concern"—falls squarely within 4