are many instances in which it is difficult to draw a sharp line to distinguish acts of individuals that are within the private sphere and those that are within the public sphere. Even if the partial unconstitutionality decision were to be rendered, there would still be a possibility that a chilling effect would result from the vagueness between alleging “facts that amount to secrecy of private life” and alleging “facts that do not amount to secrecy of private life.” (e) Taking all of the above considerations together––namely, the need for protection of the right to personality concerning the reputation of an individual; that there is no less restrictive alternative that would serve the same legislative purpose as the Provision at Issue; that the restrictions on freedom of expression are minimized by the ground for justification under Article 310 of the Criminal Act as well as by the Court’s and the Supreme Court’s constructions and application of that ground for justification; that if a decision of partial unconstitutionality were rendered, there would be a possibility that the vagueness of “facts that amount to secrecy of private life” would lead to a new chilling effect––the least restrictive means prong is also satisfied. 3. Balance of interests Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees, in Section (1), freedom of expression, but at the same time prescribes, in Section (4), that neither the press nor any publication shall violate the honor or rights of other persons, thereby declaring the “honor or rights of other persons” as a limit to freedom of expression. Since true facts are the foundation of healthy debate and discussion, the members of society should be guaranteed free expression of those facts; yet, if defamatory statements against a specific person are indiscriminately permitted only by reason of the truthfulness of those statements, the reputation and personality of individuals may not be properly protected. - 13 -