civil litigation, it is not easy through civil remedies, even if won, to restore the reputation that has been injured thus far and rectify the harm caused by the injury. Recently, the channels of distribution of defamatory statements are not only confined to speech, documents, paintings, or publications, but also include information and communications networks. Because the data in these networks are repeated and reproduced immediately and extensively, it is virtually impossible for the defamed to identify and rebut every defamatory statement or to demand removal thereof (see Constitutional Court 2013Hun-Ba105 etc., February 25, 2016). For this reason, a preliminary injunction etc. cannot be regarded as an effective remedy for defamation. Moreover, the remedies under Articles 14 through 17-2 of the Act on Press Arbitration, Damage Remedies, Etc., such as the requests for issuance of a correction, publication of a rebuttal, or publication of a subsequent clarification, are not appropriate remedies for defamation made by ordinary individuals, as opposed to the press etc. In this situation, where there are no effective remedial methods available for defamation, the victim in today’s reality has no choice but to rely on an offense of criminal defamation as a means to encourage, inter alia, immediate suspension of the defamatory act, voluntary disposal of publications etc., and voluntary deletion of posts in information and communications networks. In view of these considerations, we do not find that there is a less restrictive alternative that would serve the same legislative purpose as the Provision at Issue, which prohibits factual defamation and prescribes criminal sanctions for this ban. (c) Article 310 states that the act prohibited by the Provision at Issue shall not be punishable if the facts alleged are true and if solely concerned with the public interest. - 8 -