Thailand: Computer Crime Act, 2017 notice of their data being subject to search. We also find that Section 18 falls alarmingly short of containing adequate due process protections given the reaching intrusiveness of the investigative measures it authorizes. The first three measures provide no court oversight to what is essentially a limitless digital search power. The amount of time to comply seven days is so short as to preclude any meaningful judicial remedy. The latter provisions, including physical seizure provisions, merely contain a Per Section 24, any computer traffic data or user data acquired under any part of Section 18 two years imprisonment. It is not even clear whether this provision would even allow users a right to speak to an attorney regarding demands pursuant to Section 18. Recommendations: Section 18, parts (1) through (3), and Section 24, should be omitted entirely as written, or amended to require warrants including explicit due process protections, meaningful judicial oversight, and notice provisions; Section 18, parts (4) through (6), and (8), should be amended to provide explicit due process protections, meaningful judicial oversight, and notice provisions. Gag order provisions Section 20 provides far-reaching authority for officials with approval from the Minister to file petitions for writs to stop dissemination of information, or to order the deletion of data from systems. The power to gag dissemination applies to nearly limitless information, including: computer data which is connected to other criminal laws and i same Minister that approves the gag order. The suppression ability gives officials authority to compel removal or suppression, or to do it Section 20 does not provide for any procedural protections or meaningful standards or burden of proof for officials petitioning for a writ. The laxity of the procedures is illustrated by the fact that officials can apply for such writs electronically. These provisions amount to prior restraints on speech, which are rarely proportionate or satisfy a legitimate government aim outside exceptional circumstances. Section 20 falls far short from offering any meaningful checks or due process rights connected to these powers. For similar reasons, ARTICLE 19 believes that Section 21 should be stricken in its entirety. It allows officials to obtain writs to prohibit the sale or dissemination of computer data, or order its destruction. As discussed in reference to Section 13, computer tools are dual-use technologies that can have many purposes, including for academic and security research. The prevention of dissemination of malicious software that is intended to cause harm with dishonest intent can be properly addressed by incorporating adequate intentionality requirements into Section 13. ARTICLE 19 Free Word Centre, 60 Farringdon Rd, London EC1R 3GA Page 22 of 24 www.article19.org +44 20 7324 2500