Price v. City of N.Y. 50 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) the state "action was so 'egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.'" Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)). It is therefore insufficient to simply allege that a state actor failed to protect an individual, even from a known danger of bodily harm, or failed to warn that individual of such danger. *50 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125-29 (1992). "This includes dangers arising from private parties." Estate of M.D. by DeCosmo v. New York, 241 F. Supp. 3d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that a father failed to state a substantive due process claim against government officials who were aware of complaints of child abuse by the child's mother's paramour and who did not prevent the paramour from further harming the child). First, Plaintiff may contend that as a frequent crime victim, she had a "special relationship" with the NYPD that entitled her to protection from assault by private parties. This allegation is insufficient to trigger the "special relationship" exception. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court stated that a special relationship, for substantive due process purposes, springs "from the limitation which [the government] has imposed on [the plaintiff's] freedom to act on [her] own behalf." 489 U.S. at 200. For this reason, "involuntary custody" is "the linchpin of any special relationship exception." Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases); see also Cruz v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 03 Civ. 8031 (RJH), 2004 WL 1970143, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2004) ("[T]he Second Circuit has . . . only recognized 'custodial relationships such as a prison and inmate or a mental institution and involuntarily committed patient, and the relationship between a social service agency and foster child' as imposing an affirmative duty to protect on state actors." (quoting Ying Jing Gan, 996 F.2d at 533)). As the Supreme Court has explained, the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). " [N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors," id. at 195, and the language of the Due Process Clause "cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means," id. 51 It is true that in exceptional circumstances, "a governmental entity may have a constitutional obligation to provide protection, either because of a special relationship with an individual, or because the governmental entity itself has created or increased the danger to the individual." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 533 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198). The Court below examines these two exceptions to the general DeShaney rule. *51 52 In this case, the alleged harm is Plaintiff's assault by an unknown person on January 24, 2017. Plaintiff was not in the government's physical custody at any time relevant to that assault. Therefore, the City Defendants' conduct — allegedly refusing to investigate Plaintiff's reports of crimes over the past several years — does not rise to the level of a "limitation on [Plaintiff's] freedom to act on [her] own behalf." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to invoke the special relationship exception. *52 Second, Plaintiff may contend that the City Defendants' alleged refusal to process her assault complaints over the past several years, or otherwise investigate the crimes against her, "has created or increased the danger to [her]." Ying Jing Gan, 996 F.2d at 533 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198). This is commonly referred to as the "statecreated danger" exception. See Dwares v. City of 24