Price v. City of N.Y. 53 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narc. Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Estate of M.D. by DeCosmo, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 426-28 (surveying Second Circuit cases concerning the contours of the exception). This exception arises when governmental officials provide "a prearranged official sanction of privately inflicted injury," Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99, or where a "state actor aids and abets a private party in subjecting a [person] to unwanted physical harm," Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 429 (2d Cir. 2009) ("The affirmative conduct of a government official may give rise to an actionable due process violation if it communicates, explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private violence."); Pena, 432 F.3d at 111 ("[W]hen ... state officials communicate to a private person that he or she will not be arrested, punished, or otherwise interfered with while engaging in misconduct that is likely to endanger the life, liberty or property of others, those officials can be held liable under [§] 1983 for injury caused by the misconduct under Dwares."). But "an allegation simply that police officers had failed to act upon reports of past violence would not implicate the victim's *53 rights under the Due Process Clause[.]" Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99; see also Pena, 432 F.3d at 109 ("A failure to interfere when misconduct takes place, and no more, is not sufficient to amount to state created danger."). In this action, "any theory of state-created danger is fatally undermined by the absence of any allegation that [the City Defendants] affirmatively communicated, even implicitly [to Plaintiff's unidentified assailant] that abuse against [Plaintiff] was permissible." Estate of M.D. by DeCosmo, 241 F. Supp. 3d at 427. Plaintiff does not allege, for instance, that any of the City Defendants communicated to the unidentified assailant, "explicitly or implicitly, official sanction of private violence," Okin, 577 F.3d at 429, or affirmatively aided and abetted the assault of Plaintiff, see Hemphill, 141 F.3d at 418. While the City Defendants "may have been aware of the dangers that [Plaintiff] faced in the free world, [they] played no part in their creation, nor did [they] do anything to render [Plaintiff] any more vulnerable to them." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. Plaintiff's allegations — although profoundly troubling to the Court — do not rise to the level of a violation of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights. The Court therefore must grant the City Defendants' motion to dismiss the substantive due process claims against them. 4. Monell Claims Against the City for Acts of MTA Officers 54 Plaintiff also appears to assert a § 1983 claim against the City of New York related to her arrest by MTA Police Officers John and Jane Doe. (FAC ¶ 189). The Court must grant the City's motion to dismiss this claim. *54 The MTA and the City of New York are separate and distinct municipal entities for § 1983 purposes. See Lloyd v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 4303 (BMC), 2012 WL 3878116, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2012) (collecting cases); Altro v. Conrail, 130 A.D.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1987) ("The MTA is a public benefit corporation created to continue and improve railroad commuter transportation throughout a commuter transportation district including Westchester County and the City of New York." (citations omitted)). In this action, Plaintiff does not sue the MTA. Rather, she attempts to hold the City of New York liable for the conduct of the MTA's police officers. But she does not allege any facts suggesting that the City of New York was a moving force behind her arrest by MTA officers. She does not, for instance, allege that the MTA police officers were ever trained or employed by the City of New York or that the City had any control whatsoever over these officers. See Breitkopf v. Gentile, 41 F. Supp. 3d 220, 259-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); cf. N.Y. Magazine, 136 F.3d at 25