MR JUSTICE WARBY Approved Judgment NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC Misuse of private information 55. I can shortly summarise the issues in this respect (“the Misuse Issues”): (1) Does the claimant enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of any of the information at issue?; if so (2) how, on the particular facts of the case, should the balance between the rights of privacy and freedom of expression be struck? Damages 56. If the claimant succeeds on liability in respect of the Inaccuracy and/or Privacy Issues, and/or misuse of private information the question arises of what damages or compensation should be awarded (“The Damages Issue”). The Abuse Issue 57. Logically prior to all of the above is the issue that arises from one of Google’s submissions: is this action in substance a claim to protect reputation, cast as a claim under the DPA and/or the law of misuse of private information, in an illegitimate attempt to circumvent the procedural and substantive law that applies to claims in defamation? (“The Abuse Issue”). The Abuse Issue 58. Google submits that NT1’s claims are an abuse of the Court’s process as they “amount in substance to claims for damage to reputation which are intended to outflank the limits on reputation claims in the law of defamation and section 8” of the 1974 Act. Although this is advanced as a “further reason” for dismissing the claims, it is in reality a threshold issue. If the point is sound, it should result in the dismissal of the claims. 59. At the heart of Google’s argument is the proposition that the claims are “in essence” complaints about the damage caused to NT1’s reputation by the continued availability of the URLs complained of. From that starting point, it is argued that a claimant such as NT1 has no right to by-pass the protections which the law of defamation affords to the right of freedom of expression by framing his case in a cause of action other than defamation, and using this as a vehicle for recovering essentially the same relief on the same grounds. In support of his argument, Mr White relies on some of the wellknown jurisprudence in this area, which includes Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760, Gulf Oil v Page [1987] Ch 327, Lonrho v Al Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489, Service Corporation International plc v Channel Four Television [1999] EMLR 83, 89, McKennitt v Ash ([42] above), Terry (previously LNS) v Persons Unknown [2010] EMLR 16 [95] and Tillery Valley Foods Ltd v Channel Four Television Corpn [2004] EWHC 1075 (Ch) [21]. 60. Mr White also emphasises that on two recent occasions the Supreme Court has warned against using torts other than defamation to obtain relief that would not be available in that tort. In O (A Child) v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32 [2016] AC 219 [111] Lord Neuberger cautioned against attempts to “extend or supplement” defamation law by resort to a different tort (in that case, intentional infliction of psychological harm). In Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2017] UKSC 49 [2017] 3 WLR 351 Lord Sumption took the point further, emphasising the need for “coherence” in the law.