SPECIAL COLLECTION OF THE CASE LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION rather than a vague “right to be forgotten” by others is a much more fruitful avenue to analyze these complex issues, and does not leave a fundamental part of the equation in the hands of the interested party. For she may wish away certain instances or events of her life which recollection impacts the image she wants to present to the world, but that does not mean she has a right to force that on others, specially if the information being discussed is true and was legitimately gathered in the public interest. To conclude this section, a brief explanation of the operational or practical issues involved in de-indexing information is called for. First, the recognition of such a right has directly impacted a fundamental rule of internet governance, which is the immunity of intermediaries—such as search engines—from liability due to content posted by a third party. As it currently stands in many jurisdictions, a de-indexing claim can create a liability for an intermediary actor, with no need whatsoever to include in the procedures the publisher whose information is at stake. As a result, intermediaries face liability for under-removing but no liability for over-removing, which creates the kind of incentives that limiting intermediary liability as a principle sought to prevent. The second operational problem is the already mentioned lack of due process for publishers. Although in some jurisdictions Courts have recognized the need to include them in the de-indexing request, there is no clear standards or settled practices with regard to how that participation should occur. Should publishers be included in the process when the request was first made to the indexing entity? Should that inclusion occur in a legal procedure? Should it be done officiously by courts, or should intermediaries call upon publishers as interested third parties? In part, this uncertainty stems from the lack of a clear legal framework: “right to be forgotten” claims have been generally crafted by judges out of data protection schemes, that—before the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—have not included counterweight criteria such as e.g. a public interest or freedom of expression defense available to intermediaries and publishers 6. The legal vacuum has affected the due process rights of publishers, while also leaving it to the judges to create operative rules. As a result, currently there are no clear rules on how to make these sorts of claims operative. Finally, but not less importantly, is the issue of jurisdiction. Several cases ordering the de-indexing of content have limited their effects to publisher or search engines domains that operate only in the jurisdiction the request was submitted. Nevertheless, there are a considerable number of cases that have either explicitly ordered the de-indexation of content worldwide or have been vague in the exact effects of their judgment, leaving open such possibility. The negative implications of these approaches are many, but there are two that are worth highlighting. First, the imposition of a legal rule from one country to another, which has not been recognized either by the second country’s national legal system, nor the international legal order. Second, a universal order has the effect of reducing the standard of protection of freedom of expression worldwide to the lower common denominator. 6 On this, see the GDPR, Article 17 (including such a criteria). 9