SPECIAL COLLECTION OF THE CASE LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Does our past have a right to be forgotten by the Internet? Case Law on the So-Called Right to Be Forgotten The Internet has revolutionized the right to freedom of expression. It has not only enhanced and facilitated communication around the world, but has also brought new ways of thinking about expression as a fundamental right. Under the new paradigm ushered mainly by the Internet’s decentralized architecture, the exercise of freedom of expression has been democratized: it has never been easier to access information, to be informed by a variety of sources, and to take part in public debate. It is a matter of fact that this revolutionary technical and social change has created new challenges. For instance, being on the Internet has meant that many of the services we use are given to us for free, in exchange for being exposed to different forms of advertising. This model, upon which the broadcasting industry of the 20th century was based, depends on the access to the personal data we create when being on the Internet: the links we share, the sites we visit, the things we like on social media, and so on. The richness of this data has arguably created a more efficient advertising industry, but it has also revealed how important it is to protect that data from being misused or abused. The protection of personal data and, more generally, of the fundamental right to privacy online has emerged in the last few years as a fundamental concern. This is closely connected to the right of freedom of expression: the strong protection of a private sphere and the existence of rules that clarify when third parties can legitimately use personal data not only attends to the legitimate claims to protect one’s private life, but it also helps to keep public debate focused on matters of public interest. What’s more, as it has been highlighted in another publication of this collection, in some contexts, the robust exercise of freedom of expression can be dependent and enhanced by protecting privacy rights and the personal data belonging to individuals. The new challenges posed by the Internet has illuminated the many ways in which freedom of expression must be balanced against other existing rights that are closely linked to it but that can be distinguished. In performing this balancing exercise, we must be vigilant so core elements of freedom of expression are not construed away in the process, for freedom of expression is a right that has been deemed fundamental for the functioning of democratic institutions. It is precisely in this context that the practice of “de-indexation” should be analyzed. It emerged as a demand of a “new right” that the Internet, and the social changes it engendered, made possible. Since it first emerged in the 2014 judgement by the CJEU in the case of Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja, the so-called “right to be forgotten” has been considered by many courts around the globe. Some have embraced it and expanded it, others have limited it. Yet others have rejected it. This case law, broadly considered, has shaped the way different legal and constitutional systems have answered until now the challenge posed by one of the features of the Internet and the technological revolution: the possibility of information to be easily available, to exist permanently in the Internet’s decentralized architecture. 4