MAJIEDT J Findings of ulterior motive would result in the actions being dismissed without any regard to the merits of the applicants’ claims for defamation.13 [20] On leave to appeal, the applicants’ contention is that the application engages both this Court’s constitutional and general jurisdiction. They submit that their right to access to courts in terms of section 34 of the Constitution is of cardinal importance. The applicants argue that a resolution of the disputes between the parties, without reference to the merits of those disputes, implicates their right to a fair public hearing. What may constitute an abuse of process and the protections afforded to a litigant confronted with an abuse of process raise arguable points of law of general public importance that transcend the interests of the parties. [21] The applicants say that there is no dispute between them and the respondents that the interests of justice favour an appeal directly to this Court. The issues are important and of broader application than the parties. Pragmatism strongly favours this matter being heard together with that under CCT 67/21,14 and the Supreme Court of Appeal is unlikely to entertain one or both matters. According to the applicants, it appears that the respondents confine their opposition to the merits of the application. Their preference also seems to be for this Court to engage with the merits of the application at this stage. [22] The respondents’ SLAPP special pleas, according to the applicants, postulate that under the common law a litigant may raise an abuse of process as a stand-alone defence to a substantive claim and that ulterior motive alone, to the exclusion of the merits of a claim, may give rise to an abuse of process. The applicants argue that this runs contrary to cases like Maphanga15 that place clear (if not exclusive) emphasis on the merits of a claim in the abuse of process analysis. 13 In this regard, the applicants cite Khumalo v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at para 11. 14 The so-called corporate defamation defence alluded to at [7]. 15 MEC, Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs v Maphanga [2019] ZASCA 147; 2021 (4) SA 131 (SCA). 10