Case: 12-60264 Document: 00513162565 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 No. 12-60264 . . . mass, systematic school-shootings” based on the “[l]ack of forewarning and the frequent setting within schools [which] give mass shootings the unique indicia that the concurring opinion [in Morse] found compelling with respect to drug use”. Id. at 771. In challenging the summary judgment, Bell claims the school board violated his First Amendment free-speech rights by temporarily suspending him and placing him in an alternative school for the six weeks remaining in the grading period. In support, he contends: Tinker does not apply to offcampus speech, such as his rap recording; and, even if it does, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test is not satisfied. For the reasons that follow, we hold: Tinker applies to the off-campus speech at issue; there is no genuine dispute of material fact precluding ruling, as a matter of law, that a school official reasonably could find Bell’s rap recording threatened, harassed, and intimidated the two teachers; and a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast, as a matter of law. 1. As our court explained in Morgan v. Swanson, student-speech claims are evaluated “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, beginning by categorizing the student speech at issue”. (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 659 F.3d at 375 We must thus decide whether Bell’s speech falls under Tinker, or one of the Court’s above-described exceptions. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (employing a similar approach, noting “[s]peech falling outside of . . . categories [such as those in Fraser and Hazelwood] is subject to Tinker’s general rule”). The parties do not assert, and the record does not show, that the school board disciplined Bell based on the lewdness of his speech or its potential 17