Case: 12-60264 Document: 00513162565 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/20/2015 No. 12-60264 perceived sponsorship by the school; therefore, Fraser and Hazelwood are not directly on point. Bell’s speech likewise does not advocate illegal drug use or portend a Columbine-like mass, systematic school-shooting. And, as Justice Alito noted, when the type of violence threatened does not implicate “the special features of the school environment”, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard is the appropriate vehicle for analyzing such claims. Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09) (“[I]n most cases, Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ standard permits school officials to step in before actual violence erupts”.). Although threats against, and harassment and intimidation of, teachers certainly pose a “grave . . . threat to the physical safety” of members of the school community, id., violence forecast by a student against a teacher does not reach the level of the above-described exceptions necessitating divergence from Tinker’s general rule. We therefore analyze Bell’s speech under Tinker. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771–72 & n.2 (“[B]ecause [threats of violence against individual teachers] are relatively discrete in scope and directed at adults, [they] do not amount to the heightened level of harm that was the focus of both the majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Morse”.); see also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (analyzing threats of violence to individual teachers under Tinker); Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 982–83 (11th Cir. 2007) (same). 2. In claiming Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech, Bell asserts: Tinker limits its holding to speech inside the “schoolhouse gate”; and each of the Court’s subsequent decisions reinforces this understanding. “Experience shows that schools can be places of special danger.” Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). Over 45 years ago, when Tinker was 18