Central District Court 2008No1719, September 11, 2008). Later, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of those courts and remanded the cases. It found the petitioners not guilty, recognizing that their acts were for the public interest ((1) Supreme Court 2010Do8143, January 26, 2012; (2) Supreme Court 2008Do8812, May 28, 2009). These examples indicate that it is very difficult, even for legal professionals such as prosecutors and judges and for the appellate courts and the Supreme Court, to evaluate the presence of defamation, or to assess the “public interest.” Indeed, ordinary citizens will not be able to accurately predict whether their expressive activities meet the “public interest” requirement of Article 310 of the Criminal Act. We note in this respect a problem with the current structure of the Criminal Act: this structure––under which stating true facts initially constitutes an element of the crime under the Provision at Issue and its unlawfulness is later excluded in exceptional cases where the “public interest” requirement of Article 310 of the Criminal Act is satisfied––makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to foresee what expressive activity will be subjected to criminal penalties, thereby chilling even legitimate expressive conduct. Where the structure of the Provision at Issue on defamation consists of “general prohibition and exceptional permission,” not to mention that the exception is vague, a reasonable person would choose not to express facts that he or she is aware of in order to avoid the risk of, and suffering from being subjected to, investigation and trial proceedings. With this in mind, we cannot help but note the concern that even true facts concerning the public interest may eventually disappear from the forum of public debate. 5. Taking these considerations together, we disagree that the Provision at Issue satisfies the least restrictive means test. - 21 -