4 liberties under Articles 19 and 21, and prevents people from thinking about, reading and exchanging unorthodox, controversial or provocative ideas. As explained by Justice Subba Rao in Kharak Singh v Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR 332, surveillance places psychological restraints that conditions an individual’s mind and affects her freedom to think and express herself freely, in a way that impacts her personal liberty. B. The constitutional standard applicable to adjudicating privacy violations is the proportionality standard, which has now been crystallised and elaborated in K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 [“Puttaswamy (Privacy)”] and K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018) 12 SCALE 1 [“Puttaswamy (Aadhaar)”]. Section 69(1) of the IT Act and the accompanying Rules and Notification fall foul of this proportionality and necessity standard. C. Most importantly, the sub-clause (1) and (2) of Section 69 read with 2009 IT Rules lack any modicum of independence, impartiality, or application of judicial mind, and thus fail the test of adequate procedural safeguards. The present legal regime has vested the sole authority to authorise electronic surveillance to the Executive. Moreover, the authority to review such directions is entirely reserved in the hands of the Executive, without any parliamentary or judicial oversight. Consequently, the violation of fundamental rights of citizens is unilateral, leaving no recourse for aggrieved citizens to seek judicial review against arbitrary surveillance. The unquestioned discretion conferred upon the Executive is ex-facie