C. Balance of Interests Although we concur in the view that the expressive activity of alleging facts should not be used as a means to retaliate against another person, we believe that the freedom of expression of citizens and their right to know can be rendered meaningless if too much emphasis is placed solely on that view and the rule that expression of true facts about public figures or matters constitutes an element of defamation. The free formation of will and popular opinion through debate and deliberation based on true facts is the foundation of democracy; and in this connection, penalizing true factual statements for defamation can be contrary to this democratic principle and to the guarantee of freedom of expression. That personal reputation is lowered by a true factual statement cannot be viewed as an unjust result, because a true fact is one that underlies a social evaluation of a person. Nor do we see that a false or exaggerated reputation built based on concealment of truth is a legal interest warranting protection that comes at the expense of a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Article 21, Section (4) of the Constitution prescribes as a limit to freedom of expression the honor of other persons, yet it expressly provides as a remedy only civil compensation and not criminal punishment. Freedom of expression is still being chilled due to the vagueness of the ground for justification under Article 310 of the Criminal Act. Taking these considerations into account, we find it difficult to say that the Provision at Issue meets the balance of interests test. D. Need for the Decision of Partial Unconstitutionality Accordingly, we conclude that the Provision at Issue infringes freedom of expression in violation of the rule against excessive restriction. For the reasons below, however, we find that the part of the Provision at Issue concerning “the true facts that do not amount to secrecy of private life” should be declared unconstitutional. - 22 -