by excluding from criminal sanctions those cases where the facts alleged do not infringe secrecy of private life. 4. In a country of modern constitutionalism, communal decision-making, including political activities, is conducted through free expression and exchange of thoughts and ideas. As such, if freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and freedom of publication, is not guaranteed, neither democracy nor popular sovereignty can be realized. In cases where “the facts alleged are true,” emphasis needs to be placed more on freedom of expression concerning true facts than on an individual’s reputation based on falsities, since a true fact provides a basis for the free formation of will and the discovery of truth in the community. Further, in cases where “the facts alleged do not amount to secrecy of private life,” emphasis needs to be given more to the freedom of expression concerning true facts than to an individual’s reputation based on falsities, for the free formation of communal will and the development of democracy. 5. The opinion of the Court points out that a chilling effect on freedom of expression could result from the decision of partial unconstitutionality because, even if the stating of facts “that are true and do not amount to secrecy of private life” was excluded from the elements of the crime in the Provision at Issue, the meaning of “secrecy of private life” would still be vague. Admittedly, the term “secrecy of private life” can be seen as somewhat vague, but it is a constitutional right enshrined in Article 17 of the Constitution. In fact, it is a legal term currently used in a great number of statutes, including Article 14, Section (4) of the Act on the Registration, Etc. of Family Relationships; Article 18, Section (3) of the Framework Act on Health Examination; Article 29-2, Section (2) of the Infection Control Act; Article 9, Section (1), Item 6, Sub-item (b) of the Official Information Disclosure Act; Article 27, Section (2), Item 1 of - 24 -