01/08/2019
G.R. No. 202666
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard
the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has
been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their
memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB38594. To petitioners, the
interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of
habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used,
to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ
of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return,
together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the
following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b)
petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may
issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of
the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is,
the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on
Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the
factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this
case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence��of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right
to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ
may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not
prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an
online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes realtime interaction among millions, if not billions,
of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information
uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end
users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must
first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_202666_2014.html
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