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AMPARO EN REVISIÓN 136/2021 mínimo posible, esto es, en circunstancias excepcionales y limitadas, previstas en la ley, para proteger otros derechos humanos.”10 99. En ese mismo precedente la Segunda Sala determinó que la regulación estatal dirigida a restringir o permitir contenidos en el internet debía ajustarse a los derechos de libertad de expresión y acceso a la información, determinando las condiciones que el juzgador debe considerar. Cabe precisar que la Segunda Sala concluyó que era inconstitucional el bloqueo générico de una página electrónica, si era sobreinclusiva en relación al punto concreto que legítimamente puede restringir, justamente por tratarse de una violación directa a esos derechos humanos.11 100. Habiendo determinado que los referidos derechos sustantivos no tienen un límite material en su ámbito de aplicación, se sigue que el artículo 305 de la Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión debe ajustarse a sus exigencias para lograr un reconocimiento de validez. 101. No obstante, aún queda por determinar si la porción del artículo 7° constitucional, que establece la prohibición de secuestrar los bienes utilizados para la difusión de información, opinión e ideas, como instrumento del delito, es aplicable o no al derecho administrativo sancionador. 102. Esta pregunta es relevante, toda vez que el precepto constitucional formula dicha prohibición de secuestrar los bienes, asociándola a la hipótesis de que se trate de los instrumentos del delito, por lo que cabe preguntarse si fuera de la materia penal -donde cabe hablar de delitos- también aplica dicha prohibición constitucional, por ejemplo, el derecho administrativo sancionador. 10 Tesis aislada CII/2017 de la Segunda Sala, visible en la página 1433 del Libro 43 (junio de 2017), Tomo II de la Gaceta del Semanario Judicial de la Federación, de rubro: “FLUJO DE INFORMACIÓN EN RED ELECTRÓNICA (INTERNET). PRINCIPIO DE RESTRICCIÓN MÍNIMA POSIBLE.” 11 Ver la diversa tesis CV/2017 de la Segunda Sala, visible en la página 1439 del Libro 45 (junio de 2017), Tomo II de la Gaceta del Semanario Judicial de la Federación, de rubro: “LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y OPINIÓN EJERCIDAS A TRAVÉS DE LA RED ELECTRÓNICA (INTERNET). RESTRICCIONES PERMISIBLES.” 30

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Petitioner v. Federal Institute for Telecommunications and Radio Broadcasting

Case Law

Country

Mexico

Country Location

Latitude: 22.450275925480113

Longitude: -99.67675799131331

Country Location (linked Case Law): Mexico

Decision Date: Oct 5, 2022

Case Status: Closed

Case Outcome (Procedural)

Dismissed

Case Outcome (Disposition)

Judgment in Favor of Defendant/ Acquittal

Keywords

Access to Internet
Digital Rights
Internet Service Providers

Judicial Body: Supreme Court (court of final appeal)

Court Name: Supreme Court of Mexico

Case Number: Amparo 136/2021

Case Summary: The Supreme Court of Mexico held that the seizure of devices that provide internet services without a license did not violate the right to freedom of expression and access to information. Article 305 of the Federal Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law establishes that persons who provide telecommunications or broadcasting services without a license or authorization shall forfeit in favor of the Nation the property, installations, and equipment used in the commission of such infractions. The petitioner, who had devices that were used to provide internet services without the required license, claimed that the seizure violated the right to freedom of expression and access to information because the internet allowed people to express their ideas and receive information. Additionally, the petitioner referred to Article 7 of the Mexican Constitution, which establishes that “in no case property used for the dissemination of information, opinions, and ideas may be seized as an instrument of crime”. The Federal Institute for Telecommunications and Radio Broadcasting argued that there was no censorship nor restrictions to the dissemination of information, but rather a punitive measure against an illegal provision of services.

The Court held that the prohibition of the confiscation of equipment and properties used for the dissemination of information, opinions, and ideas only applies as a “hard rule” when those goods are substantially linked to the aforementioned purposes (for example, printing instruments of a newspaper or the paper needed to publish magazines or books) or when the seizure is used to censor certain ideas or points of view. Further, the Court held that devices used for the dissemination of information, opinions, and ideas should not be confused with any infrastructure or devices used for the provision of public services, and that, here, the seizure of goods did not seek to penalize a certain point of view, nor prevent a certain group of people from expressing their opinions. Additionally, the Court held that the petitioner did not engage in the provision of these irregular services to disseminate certain information, but rather they intended to make these services available to people to obtain an economic benefit. The Court noted that licenses for the provision of public telecommunications and broadcasting services are instruments that allow States to guarantee that public services, such as the internet, are provided under conditions of competition, quality, plurality, universal coverage, continuity, free access, and without arbitrary interferences for the benefit of all persons. In the Court’s opinion, the legal framework is clear and neutral, and the sanctions established to ensure its effectiveness pursue a legitimate aim and are reasonable and proportionate.

Case Significance: The decision of the Mexican Supreme Court allowed the seizure of devices that were being used to provide internet services without an appropriate license. It also clarified the standards and levels of scrutiny that must be used when analyzing these types of sanctions. Furthermore, the Court dsicussed the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the balance that must be struck when it comes to licenses and authorizations. However, it held that the seizure of goods used in the illegal provision of internet services could not be considered a disproportionate measure even in places where the internet is not easily accessible, as the petitioner argued in this case. Even if the contested measure only affects the instruments that are strictly related to the commission of the infraction, there are less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same goals, especially considering the importance of providing internet in low-access zones. A possible less restrictive alternative instead of the seizure could be, for example, a mere fine and an order or recommendation to request the appropriate license.

The decision establishes a binding or persuasive precedent within its jurisdiction.

Related Caselaw (self)

Related Law

Constitution of Mexico
National Security Law of Mexico

Source URL: Global Freedom of Expression

Collection

Columbia

Date Updated: Jul 19, 2024

Primary Documents

Judgment (Spanish)
Spanish
Download View

CYRILLA: Global Digital Rights Law

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Petitioner v. Federal Institute for Telecommunications and Radio Broadcasting

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