OOO FLAVUS AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT § 94, both cited above). Blocking access to legitimate content can never be an automatic consequence of another, more restricted blocking measure in the way in which section 15.3 allows the authorities to extend a limited blocking request to encompass an entire website. Any indiscriminate blocking measure which interferes with lawful content or websites as a collateral effect of a measure aimed at illegal content or websites amounts to arbitrary interference with the rights of the owners of such websites. The Government did not put forward any justification for the wholesale blocking order. They did not explain what legitimate aim or pressing social need the Russian authorities sought to achieve by blocking access to the applicants’ online media. The applicants’ claim that the true objective of the Russian authorities was to suppress access to the opposition media outlets gives rise to serious concern. The UN Human Rights Committee and Special Rapporteurs have emphasised that targeting online media or websites with blocking measures because they are critical of the government or political system can never be considered a necessary restriction on freedom of expression (see paragraphs 16 and 25 above). Lacking any justification for the wholesale blocking orders targeting the applicants’ websites, the Court finds that they did not pursue any legitimate aim. (e) Safeguards against abuse 39. Turning to the issue of safeguards which domestic legislation must provide to protect individuals from excessive and arbitrary effects of blocking measures, the Court reiterates that the blocking measures taken before a judicial decision was issued on the illegality of the published content amounted to a prior restraint on publications. The dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court and are justified only in exceptional circumstances. This is especially so as far as the press is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest (see Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-VIII; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, § 118, ECHR 2004-XI; Ahmet Yıldırım, cited above, § 47; and Kablis, cited above, §§ 90-91). In cases of prior restraints on the operation of media outlets such as the present one, a legal framework is required to ensure both tight control over the scope of bans and an effective Convention-compliant judicial review (see Ahmet Yıldırım, § 64, and Kablis, § 92, both cited above). 40. The Court finds that the Russian law did not provide owners of online media, such as the applicants, with any procedural safeguards capable of protecting them against arbitrary interference under section 15.3 of the Information Act. It did not require any form of involvement on the part of the website owners in the blocking proceedings. Both the Prosecutor General’s original decision and Roskomnadzor’s implementing orders had 14