computer to third parties, but that would be the result of [the plaintiffs’] argument.”94 The origin of the Stored Communications Act confirms that Congress crafted the statute to specifically protect information held by centralized communication providers. “‘Sen. Rep. No. 99–541 (1986)’s entire discussion of [the Stored Communications Act] deals only with facilities operated by electronic communications services such as “electronic bulletin boards” and “computer mail facilit[ies],” and the risk that communications temporarily stored in these facilities could be accessed by hackers. It makes no mention of individual users’ computers . . . .’”95 The plaintiffs take a different view, arguing that the plain language of the terms “facility” and “electronic communication service” are sufficiently flexible to encompass contemporary personal computing devices that are used to engage with telecommunications services. After all, when the Act was enacted, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “facilities” as “that which promotes the ease of any action, operations, transaction, or course of conduct.”96 And the 94 In re: iPhone, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (quoting Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d. 1263, 1270-71 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). 95 Garcia, 702 F.3d at 793 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99–541, at 36). 96 Black’s Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 1979). 45