plaintiffs here use their web browsers to access network services such as email and websurfing. In considering the plaintiffs’ argument that we should give “facility” a broad, plain language meaning, we are reminded that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan.”97 And we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the Act clearly shows a specific congressional intent to deal with the particular problem of private communications in network service providers’ possession. The textual cues surrounding the term “facility,” bolstered by the legislative history and enactment context of the Act, support the conclusion that “the words of the statute were carefully chosen: ‘[T]he statute envisions a provider (the [Internet Service Provider] or other network service provider) and a user (the individual with an account with the provider), with the user’s communication in the possession of the provider.’”98 And “[t]his is consistent with the [Act]’s purpose: home computers are already protected by the Fourth Amendment, so statutory protections are not needed.”99 In this context, “facility” is a term of art denoting where network service providers store private communications. 97 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 98 Garcia, 702 F.3d at 793 (emphases removed) (alteration in original) (quoting Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1215 n.47). 99 Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1215. 46