Rodriguez v. Google LLC 20-cv-04688-RS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2024) 600. In that case, the Court held that Plaintiffs had adequately established standing because they alleged their data “carr[ied] financial value” and that the defendant “profited from this valuable data.” Plaintiffs' damages expert provides two models of unjust enrichment that account for both elements capable of application class-wide. However, even if Google is right, and the “vast majority” of class members' data was only exposed to record-keeping “not tied to a person's identity or used by Google for any purpose other than to perform accounting for the apps that generated the data or advertising in the first place,” Opp. at 16, then surely that can be proven by common evidence of Google's record-keeping practices. It is unclear why Google would need to take discovery “from the 100 million privacy plaintiffs” if it engaged in a uniform policy of record-keeping. 3 Plaintiffs provide three ways damage or loss may be adjudicated class-wide: first, by proof of Google's unjust enrichment sWAA's alleged privacy violations to be able to aver they suffered harm. This would permit Google to argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to aver the instant claims as they would face no real and immediate threat. In In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 589 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (hereinafter, “Yahoo Mail Litig.”), the Court declined to place such an impossible burden on Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. Yahoo would put Plaintiffs in a catch-22 that would essentially preclude injunctive relief altogether. Yahoo would require Plaintiffs to allege both (1) that Plaintiffs, in order to avoid “consenting” to Yahoo's conduct, stopped emailing Yahoo subscribers after discovering Yahoo's alleged wrongful conduct, and (2) that Plaintiffs continued to email Yahoo subscribers so that Plaintiffs allege a real and immediate threat of future injury, i.e., that Yahoo would intercept Plaintiffs' communications in the future. class-wide; second, because Google failed to pay for collected data despite there being a “market” for it, see Brown v. Google LLC, 2023 WL 5029899 at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023); and third, by showing how the data collection negatively impacts members' devices. See Class Cert. Mot. at 3. 13 Google further insists predominance is not met because Plaintiffs “admitted they suffered no harm.” Opp. at 17. Google points to concessions by the named plaintiffs of their continued use of apps, Google accounts, and Google services, despite knowledge of the alleged privacy violations. Google argues that this behavior “fatally undermined the claim of harm because each [named plaintiff] testified they had not changed their behavior [on their] phones after learning ‘the truth' about sWAA.” Opp. at 17. This argument places an undue burden on Plaintiffs. They need *13 not show they unilaterally stopped using Google's services after learning about Id. Aside from this unworkable predicament, the ubiquitous nature of phones, coupled with the sheer number of apps with Google SDKs would render Plaintiffs' use of their phones impossible. The growing reliance on phones increasingly make them necessities, not luxuries, with significant privacy implications for users. The fact that Plaintiffs, as putative class members, affirmatively selected the WAA/sWAA-off buttons sheds light on their privacy choices as to Google's practices. Google may argue, as it does, that Plaintiffs have consented to the behavior they complain about, but Plaintiffs' continued use of Google's products and services does not equate to consent. See id. d. Damages Plaintiffs next argue that common questions predominate regarding damages. A showing of predominance may fail if “questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” Comcast Corp. v. 8