29/09/2023, 12:35 SANCHEZ v. FRANCE - 45581/15 (Judgment : No Article 10 - Freedom of expression-{general} : Grand Chamber) [2023] ECHR 418 (1… important feature of a democratic society and the Court attaches the highest importance to freedom of expression in the context of such debate (see Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 83, ECHR 2001‑VIII). The authorities’ margin of appreciation, in assessing the “necessity” of a contested measure in this context, is therefore particularly narrow (see, among other authorities, Tête v. France, no. 59636/16, § 63, 26 March 2020; Willem v. France, no. 10883/05, § 32, 16 July 2009; Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, § 20, ECHR 2006‑XIII; and Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 42, Series A no. 103). 147. Freedom of expression is especially important for an elected representative of the people, political parties and their active members and, accordingly, interference with the freedom of expression of a member of the opposition, who represents his or her electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests, thus calls for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court (see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 242, 22 December 2020; Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 137, 17 May 2016; Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, no. 2034/07, § 50, ECHR 2011; and Féret v. Belgium, no. 15615/07, § 65, 16 July 2009). (β) The existence of responsibility and limits not to be exceeded 148. While political speech calls for an elevated level of protection, the freedom of political debate is not absolute in nature. A Contracting State may make it subject to certain “restrictions” or “penalties”, but it is for the Court to give a final ruling on the compatibility of such measures with the freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 (see Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, § 245; Féret, cited above, § 63; and Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, § 46, Series A no. 236). 149. Since tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society, it follows that, in principle, it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies to penalise or even prevent all forms of expression that propagate, encourage, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance (including religious intolerance), provided that any “formalities”, “conditions”, “restrictions” or “penalties” imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Féret, cited above, § 64). However, while any individual who takes part in a public debate of general concern must not overstep certain limits, particularly with regard to respect for the reputation and the rights of others, a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation, is permitted (see Fleury, cited above, § 45, and Willem, cited above, § 33). https://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2023/418.html 61/100